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-- EZ A SZÁM CSAK TEXT FORMÁBAN LÉTEZIK --
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Date: Sat, 30 Mar 91 05:26:22 EST
Subject: *** FORUM *** #184

Tartalomjegyzek:
----------------

Felado    : boros@ohstmvsa.ircc.ohio-state.edu
Temakor   : =magyar szakertok tanacskozasa=!

Felado    : csorna@phyv01.phy.vanderbilt.edu
Temakor   : III. Magyar tortenelem - Angol szempont: Horthy Miklos

Felado    : 72600.3046@compuserve.com
Temakor   : ...from the margins - media watch IV.

 
 
===============================================
Felado    : boros@ohstmvsa.ircc.ohio-state.edu
Beerkezett: Thu Mar 28 09:03:05 EST 1991
Temakor   : =magyar szakertok tanacskozasa=!
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Regota (pontosabban azota, hogy az MSZM(P)-bol kilepett es megirta
konnyekre fakaszto bucsulevelet) vartam, hogy Pozsgay neve mikor bukkan
fel ujra a sajtoban egy uj part megalapitasaval kapcsolatban.
Az alabbi hirdarabot a HIRMONDObol masoltam be es
rogvest meg is kongatom a veszharangot avval, hogy itt valami keszul.
Abban a meghato es "oszinte hangu" bucsulevelben Pozsgay meg azt
igerte,
hogy most egy hosszabb pihenot tart.
Ugy latszik viszont, hogy o sem birja hosszabb ideig
a hatalombol valo kirekesztettseget, a regeneralodashoz igy
par honap is elegendo. Nos, hogy ez igy bejott, barkivel fogadok,
hogy honapok mulva egy centrista szakertoi part fog alakulni a most
felbukkano Fuggetlen Szakertoi Kor tagjaibol, persze ezt meg nem
vehetjuk biztosra, hiszen "errol szo sincs". Soha nem fogom elfelej-
teni, mikor Pozsgay a Grosz puccs idejen a Parlament folyoso-
jan egy fotelben elterulve bofogte a TV Hirado kamerajaba, hogy itt
a lenini elvekhez kell visszaterni, mert el vagyunk terve.
Kesobb kikersztelkedett kommunista multjabol, ez sem segitett,
megirta konnyekre fakaszto bucsulevelet (elolvasas utan rogton a
kukaba vagtam) es most itt all egy uj magyar szakertoi garda elen
a partalapitas lehetosegevel, bolcsen, megtorve, de uj
remennyekkel.
A veszharang megkongatasanak okai:
- Nem ismerem a tanacskozas resztvevoinek listajat, de lefogadom,
hogy tobbseguk a kommunista uj elit fenegyereke mindenfele fokoza-
tokkal es disszertaciokkal es persze felsofoku vegzettseggel.
- Nem hiszem, hogy ennek az elitnek kielegito lehet a jelenlegi
magyarorszagi helyzet, ahol ha mas nem is, de a hatalomvaltas
a csucson vegbement. Aktiv koruk ellenere valoszinuleg bizonytalan
helyzetet teremt a volt elit szamara az, hogy masok ulnek azokban a
szekekben, amik  nekik melegedtek. Igy most ujra nagy felelosseget il-
lik mutatni a Magyar Nep irant es termeszetesen csinalni kell valamit.
A "Szakertoi Kor" valoszinuleg ennek az elitnek ad kozos fedelet.
A most bemasolt hir egyebkent kivancsiva tesz: mindenki kepzelje
el, ha peldaul lenne egy tabletta, ami mondjuk 24 orara egy kozepkoru,
hitehagyott, a hatalombol kikopott es a multjat legszivesebben a WC-n
lehuzo neoreformkomcsi ertelmisegive
tenne, milyen csodalatos lenne erezni mindazt a felelosse-
get, amit ezek az emberek ereznek irantunk, milyen jo lenne erezni
azt a tenniakarast, ami egyszeruen nem hagyja a volt elcsapat
tagjait pihizni es meg mi minden egyeb klassz dolgot, peldaul
az aggodast es tudni azt magaunkrol, hogy a legokosabbak vagyunk.
Jo lenne egy ilyen tabletta, bar az igazsagot megvallva csak akkor
vennem be, ha a hatasa garantaltan elmulna 24 ora utan. Nem erdemlem
en azt meg, hogy ilyen kemeny gerincu, torhetetlen, egyenes tekintetu,
oszinte, meg nem alkuvo es becsuletes kommunista legyek csak ugy egy
tablettatol, mig masok egy fel eleten at ernek ilyenne. Alljon hat itt
a hir.
__________________________________________________________________
Magyar szakertok konferenciaja (NSZ)

A het vegen ketnapos fuggetlen szakertoi konferenciat tartottak, amelyen
szociologusok, vallalkozok, politologusok es a kozelet mas kepviseloi
mellett reszt vett Pozsgay Imre es Biro Zoltan is.  A tanacskozason
jelen levo Fuggetlen Szakertoi Kor feladata a meglevo ismeretek
hasznositasaval egy olyan alternativ program elvi alapjainak
kidolgozasa, amely kepes a valsagot kezelni, es a kivezeto utat
megtalalni.  Ez a konferencia egyelore nem politikai mozgalom
elinditasat jelenti, partalapitasrol sincs szo.  Csupan a tarsadalom
^Lgondjaira keresik a valaszt.  Termeszetesen nem kizart, hogy kesobb
bejegyzett partkent lepnek nyilvanossag ele - mondta Pozsgay Imre.  A
tanacskozason megallapitottak, hogy a novekvo elszegenyedes
bizonytalansagot szul a tarsadalomban, ez a bizonytalansag egyes
retegeket szelsoseges diktaturikus torekveseknek is kiszolgaltathat.  A
gazdasagpolitikaban soha nem latott programdomping van, azonban ezek
fatalisan hasonlitanak egymasra.  Nem a programok masolasara van
szukseg, hanem egy valoban mukodo gazdasagpolitika kidolgozasara.  Ujra
kell gondolni az adossagfugges elleni kuzdelem strategiajat, az adossag
legalabb reszleges leirattatasanak gazdasagi, penzugyi, es politikai
felteteleit.

Mint ismeretes Pozsgay Imre Biro Zoltannal egyutt babaskodott az MDF
megalakulasanal.  Akkor is egy tarsadalmi szervezet letrehozasan
munkalkodtak.  Biro Zoltan elmondta, hogy most is a kiutkereses
gondolata vezerli oket, mert az orszag konnyen katasztrofaba sodrodhat.
Az MDF alapitolevelenek gondolatai most sem idegenek toluk, de masok a
korulmenyek.  Biro szerint az MDF iranyvonala a valasztasok utan tort
meg azzal, hogy kormanyzati pozicioba kerultek.  Bar Antall Jozseffel
nagyon sok dologban kulonboznek, az MDF-bol valo kilepesenek donto oka
azok a politikai modszerek, az az iranyitasi gyakorlat, amelyek nem
fernek ossze az alapelvekkel.
____________________________________________________________________
Magyarorszagon ma mindenki szabadon alapithat partot, igy csak tisz-
telet a szandekert azoknak, akik ilyen dologba fognak. Igy van ez
Pozsgai Imre es Biro Zoltan (partalapitasi) kezdemenyezesevel is, a
furcsa csak az, hogy mindketten immaron a harmadik partot boldogitanak,
illetve ketto eddig nem tetszett. Pontosabban az MSZMP jo lehetett,
mert azt tobb evtizedig formalgattak, csiszolgattak mindketten, kilepni
nem volt surgos.
Talan meg idefer:
Oszinten kivanom mindenkinek, hogy aki hatalomra vagyik, kapja is meg
azt akkoraban, amekkoraban csak akarja. En a hatalomnak csak az egyik
oldalat kostoltam meg gyerekkoromban, mikor a fertozo osztalyon fekud-
tem a korhazban. Elviselhetetlen volt a bezartsag, foleg, hogy a kor-
terem ablaka elott a fuben egy kerek valami csillogott es en nem tud-
tam kimenni megnezni mi az. El tudom kepzelni ugyan azt a kis csillogo
bigyot Saddam, Gorbacsov vagy barmelyik "bolcs" partvezer ablaka elott.
Ok sem tudnak kimenni erte, noha egyikojuk sem fertozo beteg.
Egyebkent az en kis csillogo bigyom
egy egyszeru kis kupak volt. Tisztelettel: Boros Laszlo

===============================================
Felado    : csorna@phyv01.phy.vanderbilt.edu
Beerkezett: Thu Mar 28 15:36:28 EST 1991
Temakor   : III. Magyar tortenelem - Angol szempont: Horthy Miklos
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 EZ A MASODIK RESZ! AZ ELSO RESZ MEGJELENT FORUM # 180
 
 A hirekben olvastuk, hogy a magyar tengereszek haza fogjak hozni Horthy
Miklos hamvait. Szinten olvastuk (Forum #175) Takacsi-Nagy Pal kerdeset:
 
              "Hogy ertekelhetjuk Horthy Miklos szerepet ?". 
 
Vajon hogy valaszolnak erre a kerdesre a liberalis nyugati demokraciak ?
 
 Mivel ezzel a temaval, ugy mint majdnem minden mas temaval kapcsolatban,
az 1945-1990-es bolsevista korszakban Magyarorszagon csak a legegbekialtobb 
hazugsagokat lehetett irni, nyilvanosan mondani, forduljunk a kulfoldhoz 
egy targyilagosabb szempontert.
 
 Az alabbit Prof. Macartney irta. Macartney tobb even keresztul Magyarorszagon
elt, jol beszelte a nyelvet, es a haboru alatt a BBC magyar nyelvu adasat 
kozvetitette. Sok magyar jellegu kerdesben az Encyclopaedia Britannica 
Macartney munkajara hivatkozik.
 
 Persze Macartney kuncsaftjai angolok voltak, ugyhogy az angolok
buneit igyekszik takargatni. Szinten, Horthy a haboru alatt ellenseg volt.
Mindennek ellenere ajanlom mindenkinek, hogy a konyvet olvassa el:
 
OCTOBER FIFTEENTH, A History of Modern Hungary 1929-1945, by C.A. Macartney,
The Edinburgh University Press, 1961.
 
 Harom reszben hozom, mert eleg hosszu ez a beszamolo, nem akarok
"circuit overload"-ot okozni olvasoimnak, es akarok alkalmat
adni, hogy az olvasok tudjanak csamcsogni az anyagon egy kicsit, es ha
kedvuk van, hozzaszolni. Az elso resz beszamolt Horthy szemelyes
tulajdonsagairol, ez a resz politikai dolgokkal foglalkozik, a
harmadik resz pedig sokaknak egy nagy meglepetest fog hozni.
 
Igy szolt Macartney Horthyrol: (A szamok a zarojelben a labjegyzetre utalnak.)
-----------------------------
 
   His [ie. Horthy's] position on the Legitimist question was, for once, 
unusual. His social class, his religion, his childhood's environment, might 
easily have made of him a dyed-in-the-wool Kuruc; yet some boyhood's fancy 
for the sea had taken him into a different world, on to waters more spacious 
than the Tisza, and into a different environment: that of the Imperial and 
Royal Navy. Later, the calculation of others had brought him into the personal
service of the King-Emperor himself as an aide-de-camp to Franz Josef, for 
whom he conceived a deep and sincere admiration and affection(1).
 
   This happened in the easy days when only a very fanatical and narrow
patriot with an exceptionally tetchy conscience needed to regard loyalty to
the Monarch as incompatible with devotion to Hungary, and vice-versa.
Horthy was one of those who achieved the synthesis. While in the Imperial
and Royal service he seems to have accepted its ideals and its ideology
wholeheartedly enough, and one may well believe, as King Charles himself
believed right up to March 1921, that when he accepted the Regency he did
so with the sincere intention of holding the fort until his King could return
and relieve him.
 
   By the spring of 1920 Horthy had already spent nine or ten months in the
almost exclusive company of Szeged officers, most of them (and particularly
his assistant, Gombos, who certainly had acquired great influence over him)
fanatical "Free Electors." They must have felt reasonable confidence in his
views on the Habsburg question, or they would not have helped him, as they
did, to the Regency (3). He had been Regent another long year in the same
company and that of Bethlen, who had by then gone a long way to meet
the anti-Legitimists, before King Charles made his first attempt to recover
his throne; another eight months before the attempt was repeated. How far
he required to wrestle with himself before, on the first occasion, he ordered
the Army to obey only him, and on the second authorised the giving of a free
hand to Gombos-with the result that the King's train was met with artillery
fire-we will not enquire (2).  But inevitably, from that moment on, the
Legitimists regarded him as their enemy and adopted towards him an attitude
of hostility and froideur which a few of them maintained to the last.
 
   Naturally, Horthy was then widely identified in the popular mind with
the "Szeged" circles, even by contrast with those of Bethlen.  And, in fact
 
 
LABJEGYZET:
(1) He had in his study at Kenderes a portrait of Franz Josef 
painted by himself (incidentally, a surprisingly good piece of work).  
Montgomery (The Unwilling Satellite, p. 4l) has recorded the pathetic fact 
that in an emergency Horthy would ask himself how his old master would have
behaved.
(2) The question discussed fully, in a spirit very hostile to Horthy, in 
Borovicseny's work.
(3) Army detachments surrounded Parliament when Horthy was elected Regent, 
but it is unlikely that any other candidate would have stood a chance without 
them. Whatever his attitude towards his crowned King, Horthy certainly did
not afterwards want Charles' son on the throne: Doc. G.F.P. C. II, 444
(10th May 1934) show him secretly proposing to Hitler "a settlement of the
German-Austrian conflict along German lines", to which Hungary should
contribute, in order to prevent a Habsburg restoration in Austria.
 
his special partisans, even his special friends at the time, were drawn almost
entirely from the Szeged circle. But what attracted him in these men was
probably-besides the flattery which they lavished on him-the military
forthrightness of their attitude towards both Bolshevism and revision. He
was never truly a "Right Radical-either for good or for ill; he was a
Conservative, with a stake in the country.  He differed from the Right
Radicals on both the great shibboleths of Hungarian politics, the land
question and the Jewish question. On the former, he was a complete die-
hard. He did not want anyone to starve, and he was not so greatly concerned
for his own acres, of which he did not possess so very many (although he
would have failed to see what principle of justice could have been invoked to
take them away from him); but, as he chose once patiently to explain on the
wireless to the people who seemed unable to understand the point, and again,
characteristically, in his interview with the Left-wing leaders a few days
before his abdication, the idea of giving everybody enough land to live on
was absurd anyway, because there was not enough land to go round (in
which, as a matter of fact, he was not so far wrong). Complicated calcula-
tions on how to get over this difficulty would have been beyond him.
 
   He was against the Right Radicals also on the Jewish question. The
fact was not easily perceived in the early 1920's, because of his associa-
tion with White Terrorist reprisals. But even if he made the common
identification of World Bolshevism and World Jewry, it was Bolshevism, not
Jewry, that he wanted to wipe out. He had, it is true, no sympathy with the
type of Jew whom the Hungarian anti-Semitic Press loved to depict: the
skulker, the usurer, the racketeer and the black marketeer. But he was no
racialist, freely admitting that there could he, and indeed were, many good
Jews who were also good Hungarians. These he regarded as entitled to
treatment in accordance with their own conduct, and was prepared to protect
them against injustice as vigorously as he had (this was how he saw the
counter-revolution) saved Hungary from the evil Jews in 1919.
 
   His essential Conservatism was there even in 1919 and it became more
strongly marked with every year after 1922. He never, indeed, shook him-
self wholly free of the personal associations which dated from the turbulent
days, the less so since the Szeged Idea was so strongly represented in the
Army, which he regarded with such special trust and affection. But, as time
went on, he moved increasingly away from their ideas, partly no doubt
helped by the fact that as Legitimism ceased to be a live issue, the 
aristocrats,  except for a few die-hards, got over their prejudices against 
him, and instead of combating him, tried to influence him. Advancing years, 
if nothing else, turned him more conservative just as the class which he had 
originally been alleged to typify (although if he did, it was the old brand, 
the real "gentry," not their unhappy epigones) was growing more radical.  
Gombos, his personal favourite, disappointed him, and by the time Imredy 
came he had neither sympathy nor understanding left for either the good or 
the bad sides of the younger generation's programme.  Their violent 
anti-Semitism revolted him, their plans for social reform seemed to him 
subversive and dangerous.  So he moved over to what in the curious terminology 
of Hungarian politics was called the Left and did in fact, as we shall show 
in due course, come to contain, although not to consist exclusively of what 
we in England call by that name. It was not, of course, by the quarter where 
those tents were pitched that Horthy entered the camp, although the effect in
practice was not very different. From his point of view what happened was
that he became increasingly averse from change, confined himself increasingly
to the simple defence of established things. His trusted advisers were by now
mostly aristocrats or near-aristocrats, almost all the men of his own genera-
tion(1); this made his policy increasingly an old man's policy, with all its
inherent defects of inelasticity and imperviousness to change, but also its
advantages in those cases where the change advocated would have been for
the worse. So it came about that not only for Jews but also for Liberals and
even Socialists Horthy's Conservatism became, in the end, their strongest
shield and defence, and Horthy's Hungary, which had perpetrated the first
pogroms of modern Europe (to exclude Czarist Russia from that term) and
established the first thorough-going counter-revolution against the Left, was
from 1940 to 1943 almost the Continent's last refuge for Jews and the last
country within the orbit of the Axis to allow the existence of a Social
Democrat Party; and that precisely in the years when Horthy's personal
power was almost absolute. And it was the Right and not the Left which
revolted against him at the last.
 
LABJEGYZET: (1) This became very pronounced in the 1940's. 0ne gentleman who 
had held a very important office in Hungary said to me: "I often had to see 
Horthy on official business, and he always treated me with the utmost courtesy,
but he never took me into his inner circle of advisers, because I was too 
young."
===============================================
Felado    : 72600.3046@compuserve.com
Beerkezett: Thu Mar 28 17:22:24 EST 1991
Temakor   : ...from the margins - media watch IV.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

   A minap  a szokasos  felmazsa junk  mail kozott  talaltam a Common Cause
nevu  "nonprofit,  nonpartisan  citizens'  lobbying  organization"-tol  egy
levelet, amelyben arra szolitanak fel (recycled papiron...), hogy irjam ala
a  mellekelt  nyomtatott  peticiot,  es  kuldjem el az ugyancsak mellekelt,
megcimzett  boritekban   ket  kongresszusi   kepviselonek.   A   peticioban
alairasommal  arra  kerem  fel  oket,  hogy  vessenek  veget a kongresszusi
valasztasoknak   a   lobbik   (Political   Action   Committees,  vagy PACs)
adomanyaibol valo finanszirozasanak.  Nehany adat a levelbol:
   ITEM: Special-interest  PACs  gave  House  and  Senate  incumbents $120
million for their 1990 campaigns,  eight times the $14.9 million  PACs gave
to challengers.
   ITEM: Successful  candidates for  the U.S.   Senate in  1990 raised,  on
average, NEARLY $4 MILLION  EACH.  That means that  to win a Senate  seat a
candidate had to raise an average of $12,000 per week for six years!   (nem
csoda, hogy torvenyhozasra nem marad idejuk...)
   ITEM: Nine out of every  10 House incumbents seeking reelection  in 1990
were in financially uncompetitive races  - that is, their opponents  lacked
the resources to run  competitive campaigns.  The outcome?   Despite public
anger at what was going on in Washington, an overwhelming 96 percent of the
House  and  Senate  incumbents  who  sought  reelection  in  1990 won.  PAC
contributions have built a wall  of political money around incumbents  that
makes them nearly invincible.
   Congressional  elections  are  being  bought  and  paid  for  by special
interests who are interested in reelecting incumbents and buying  influence
with them in congress.  THE SYSTEM IS RIGGED.

   Egyik  oka,  amiert  a  szenatoroknak  es kepviseloknek ennyi penzre van
szukseguk egy kampany soran, az  a T.V. ido megvetele.  Nehany  masodperces
on-reklam  vagy  az  ellenfel  befeketitese  a  T.V.-n  tizezrekbe   kerul.
Marpedig  akinek  itt  nincs  hozzaferese  a T.V.-hez, az eleve veszteskent
indul.   A  PAC-ek  a  kongresszusi  emberek  lefizetesevel  azokat a sajat
erdekeik mogott sorakoztatjak  fel.  A legutobbi  nagy botrany a  Savings &
Loan bankok csodbemenetele volt, ebben az ugyben ot szenator is saros lett.
A csod kifizetese 500 milliard dollarba fog kerulni az elkovetkezo  harminc
ev soran az adofizetoknek.
   Az utobbi evek leghatasosabb grass-roots szervezodesi formaja  egyebkent
az  ilyen  jellegu  level  kampany  volt,  mint a Common Cause-e is.  Ehhez
persze kell egy posta, amelyik  ilyen mennyisegu levelet a tobb  szaz tonna
egyeb junk mail mellett naponta gond nelkul kezbesiteni tud.  Na meg persze
nehany hektarnyi erdo is...
   Akit a  washingtoni hatalmi  jatek nitty-gritty  reszletei erdekelnenek,
annak ajanlanam a szervezet hasonlo cimu - Common Cause Magazine-jat, amely
National Magazine Award dijat is nyert.
                                     %

   A New  York-i kiadasu  The Guardian  (Independent Radical  Newsweekly)-t
1948-ban alapitottak.  Alapito tagja volt a tavaly elhunyt angol  ujsagiro,
Cedric Belfrage is, akit a McCarthy korszakban kiutasitottak az  orszagbol.
O irta errol a korszkrol  szerintem az egyik legjobb osszefoglalo  konyvet:
The American Inquisition 1945-1960 - A Profile of the "McCarthy Era"
(Thunder's Mouth Press).
   A Guardian marc. 13-i szamaban talalhato egy erdekesebb elemzes a  92-es
defense  budget-rol  es  a  kutatasi  koltsegek  kapcsolatarol.   Idezet  a
cikkbol.  (Gyerekek, itt most rafaragtatok!  Szereztem ugyanis kiprobalasra
egy  kezi  scannert  hozzavalo  OCR  szoftverrel,  ami azt jelenti, hogy az
eddigieknel is hosszabb idezetekkel tudlak gyotorni Benneteket.)

   Instead  of  the  hoped-for  conversion--remember those post-Berlin Wall
calls  for  "beating  swords  into  plowshares"?--the Department of Defense
plans to knit  the military interests  so closely with  the civilian sector
that the two become inseparable.   Militarization of the entire economy  is
the best insurance against demilitarization.  Toward that end, the Pentagon
is trying to model itself after Japan's Ministry of International Trade and
Industry--the legendary MlTI that  coordinates all aspects of  research and
development in Japanese corporations, including identifying and funding new
technologies, helping  their diffusion  into consumer  products and finding
export markets.
   Bush's 1992  defense budget  is consistent  with this  approach.  As the
administration cuts  defense outlays,  it adds  substantially to  funds for
scienlific research and development.  The changes in the two are related.
   Research in  science and  technolugy is  the biggest  winner in the 1992
budget.  After inflation  it would receive  an 8 percent  increase, or $8.4
billion, for a total of $75.6  billion in 1992.  By comparison the  rest of
the budget would rise by only 2.6 percent.  This increase in total  science
and technology funding  falls far short  of the doubling  that the American
Association for the  Advancement of Science  called for last  month, but is
much more substantial than for any other budget category.

WHAT'S IN A NAME?
   Overall defense spending, on the other hand, would fall to $295 billion,
dropping by about $4 billion, or 1.2 percent from the 1991 level.  Although
the budget  does not  include the  full cost  of the  war against Iraq (the
allies are expected to pay the bill), the Bush team can silence its critics
by claiming to propose  for the first time  since the mid-1970s, an  actual
year-to-year reduction in military spending.
   One link between the military  and civilian sectors is obvious:  Some of
what the budget takes out of defense, it adds on to science and technology.
About 60  percent of  the science  budget will  be spent on defense-related
projects.  It  is not  clear that  the Pentagon  will directly control this
part of the science and technology budget, but it is earmarked for advanced
versions of  the cruise  missile and  Stealth bombers.   Some of  the other
priority areas in  the science and  technology budget clearly  overlap with
pet Defense  Department projects;  for instance  the $l49  million to build
faster computers and fiber optics networks, one of the three priority areas
identified in  the Pentagon's  January 1991  report on  "Defense Technology
Strategy."
   Important though  militarization of  scientific research  is, it  is not
new.  At least since the beginning of World War II, scientists have  worked
on federally funded, war-related projects, and military funding has  played
a significant role in U.S. academia  and industry.  By 1960, as much  as 80
percent of all the federal research and development budget was being  spent
on  defense-related  projects.   After  a  drop  in  the 1970s, the numbers
climbed again  fom 48  percent in  1980 to  87 percent  in 1989.   With its
enormous resources and political clout, the Pentagon has been the surrogate
industrial policy agency for the past four decades.

   ...The sharpened trend toward a larger role for the Pentagon in civilian
research started with a report,  issued two days after Bush's  election, by
the  Defense  Science  Board,  a  study  group that advises the Pentagon on
scientific  matters.   The  28-member  panel,  including  defense  industry
stalwarts  (like  Martin  Marietta,  Hughes  Aircraft, Boeing and Textron),
academics  and  Pentagon  officials,  was  chaired by Robert Fuhrman, chief
operating officer of Lockheed Corp.  The panel asserted that the dependence
on  foreign  suppliers  for  critical  components  of  weapon  systems  had
"diminished the credibility of our deterrent" and called upon the president
to reverse  the "loss  of technological  leadership to  both our allies and
adversaries."
   The  Fuhrman  report  called  upon  the  president to make sure that the
Pentagon  is  more  directly  involved  in  shaping  the  nation's economic
policies.  It urged him to establish an industrial policy committee chaired
by the  national security  adviser and  including Pentagon representatives.
The panel also  urged the department  to support industrial  consortiums to
explore the frontiers of  science and technology, to  encourage cooperative
research between universities and private firms and to give more freedom to
Defense-sponsored labs to transfer technologies to commercial companies.

...'DUAL USE'
   It  is  too  early  to  tell  how  the  Gulf  war will influence defense
research, but it appears that the idea of Pentagon-funded dual use research
is here to  say.  Last year  while Congress tightened  the belts of  almost
everyone in the Pentagon, it actually  raised the 1991 budget for DARPA  by
14  percent,  including  $75  million  for  high definition television, $63
million more  than the  White House  had requested.   Congress continues to
support Sematech  with $100  million a  year from  the Pentagon.   Both the
defense  industry  and  the  Pentagon  uphold  Sematech, a consortium of 14
electronic  companies  with  the  Pentagon  represented  on  its  board  of
technical advisers, as a model for joint ventures.
   Electronics and high definition television are both closely tied to  the
civilian economy.  Advocates of Defense support for high density television
claim that  it will  increase demand  for semiconductors  since it needs 40
percent more memory chips than regular television.  This investment is thus
supposed to increase the profitability of U.S. semiconductor manufacturers.
Semiconductors are, of course, at the heart of computers, jet fighters  and
modern weapons.  This logic legitimizes  a consumer electronic item as  the
Pentagon's concern.
   Dual technology is being promoted as a job-preserving alternative to the
peace movement's demand  for conversion of  weapons facilities to  civilian
use.  But  the two  represent vastly  different political  philosophies and
visions of the future.
   Conversion calls  for dismantling  the war  machine and  a political and
institutional transformation of the society to make it more democratic  and
humane.  Dual use, on the other hand, is designed to harness the human  and
material resources of  the civilian sector  for military purposes.   Unlike
conversion,  dual  technology  does  not  renounce  war.   Indeed, Pentagon
support  of  commercial  technologies  is  supposed  to  improve   military
preparedness.
   The most  frightening aspect  of the  increased role  of the Pentagon in
setting industrial policy, however, is that it enshrines national  security
as a major criterion for  deciding which civilian technologies to  support.
The goal of improving health  and the environment and solving  other global
human  problems  will  not  be  sufficient  to  justify federal support for
research and development.
                                     %

   Marcius 26-i hir a gyoztes nyugati frontrol.  A Food Research and Action
Center ma tette kozze haromeves, tobb millio amerikai csaladdal  folytatott
felmeresenek  eredmenyet.   Eszerint  ma  Amerikaban  minden este ot es fel
millio tizenket even aluli gyerek  megy ehesen aludni.  Tovabbi hat  millio
gyerek van kiteve az ehezes veszelyenek.  Ezzel osszesen minden negyedik 12
even aluli amerikai gyerek ehezik vagy az ehezes hataran all.

Leirer Laszlo

U.I. Posfai Janos valaszlevelerol nem feledkeztem meg, csak a Forum 179-es
es 180-as szamait valamilyen oknal fogva nem kaptam meg. Hollosi Jozsit
kellett megkernem, hogy kuldje el oket, es csak ma kaptam meg.